TABLE OF CONTENTS
GIs of the 4th Infantry Division receive a joyous welcome amid the liberation of Paris in August 1944.
Clash in the Hedgerows: The Push to Paris
The 4th spent one week occupying Cherbourg and moving from one assembly area to another. Scarcely any time could be devoted to resting and to training the new men who had replaced their abundant casualties. Even this respite was denied to the Division Artillery. Hardly had the last round been delivered on Cherbourg when the first round was fired in support of the attack of the 90th Infantry Division some 25 miles to the south. July 6 saw elements of the 4th move into position of the 83rd Division preparatory to launching an attack through the hedgerow country west of Carentan. Throughout this part of Normandy extended large areas of swampy land impassable to an advancing army.
Originally, this swampy terrain had been of great advantage to them as it had made far easier the task of holding back German troops bent upon cutting through them to Cherbourg. Now, as the direction of their main attack was shifted directly to the south and through this country, they found ourselves attempting to fight their way through a well-positioned enemy. Few types of terrain could lend themselves so well to the requirements of the defender, for here one could dig himself into the hedgerows. To say that the German troops took full advantage of this country's defensive propensities would be understating the truth, for they improved upon them. Against these defenses, the division hurled its might. The first day's gain was 400 yards.
Seven days later, total gains were four miles. This slow, costly and bitter fighting was all to the enemy's advantage—they were forced to fight right down the corridors which the Germans expected them to follow, and the enemy was ready and willing to lay down murderous machine gun fire or artillery barrages upon the 4th. During this period, numerous air bombardments of enemy positions were planned, but each time weather conditions prevented use of air support. Having fought its way to a point near Periers, the Division was pulled out of the line in order to make preparations for the great "breakthrough" to the south.
Up until July 25, the Allied armies had realized what might be called, in a great strategic plan, limited objectives: a beachhead and a port through which to supply future operations. The Allied command realized the armies were advancing but that the gains were bought at such a cost as to make this virtually a war of attrition. Some great blow had to be dealt to the German Army that would send it reeling back, giving the command the opportunity to utilize the tremendous forces at its disposal and which it was amassing behind the lines. This blow, an aerial assault followed by a ground advance, was to be an operation which would punch a hole in the enemy line through which the newly-landed Third U. S. Army, packed behind their front, could pour. The drive was to be made by the VII Corps, with the 4th Division in the center, the 9th on the right, and the 30th on the left.
On July 25, planes flew over, not as on the day before an abortive attack, but in full strength. A combined force, including heavy bombers, making a grand total of three thousand planes, pounded the enemy's front lines. This was not just a great bombardment—it was by all odds the greatest air attack in history. At 0940 the first dive bombers flew over to begin the attack; then followed the heavies. It was a magnificent sight and the Division got a front row view of everything from their positions 1,000 yards back of the target. A huge cloud of dust began to rise over the target and it rolled back toward the waiting infantry.
Unfortunately, the succeeding waves of bombers used this cloud as the target-marker and the bombing dropped back until the infantry was being hit. Men were killed and many others were either wounded or completely stunned. The ferocity of this bombardment left a lasting imprint upon those lucky enough to survive. Lieutenant George Wilson later wrote, “The destructive power of those thousands of five hundred-pound bombs overwhelmed the senses. The dead from both sides lay twisted and torn, some half buried by overturned earth. Bloated cows with stiff legs thrust skyward in death lay everywhere, as did burned-out vehicles and blasted equipment. I've never been able to erase it from my mind.”
Despite this terrifying experience, the four assault companies jumped off at 1100 from their positions 1,000 yards north of the St. Lo-Periers highway. The enemy who had felt the full weight of the mighty blow (that is—what was left of him) fought back with fanaticism and the Division's gains were limited. However, as the drive continued into the night it gathered speed and gained about 2 1/2 kilometers by midnight. It was in the 4th Division zone that real progress was made; it was this Division which pulled the attack forward. The infantry continued to push hard all the next day; and on into the night, in many cases becoming engaged in running fights with columns of fleeing Germans under cover of darkness.
As the giant dagger was being driven into and through the Nazi line, a large pocket of those Germans formed west of the dagger, and as this grew in size its potentiality as a threat to the flank of the Division increased. For this reason, part of the Division was deployed all along the left flank to contain this enemy force centering on Cerisy-la-Salle. Several days later the Germans attacked, but they were stopped and over 2,000 prisoners were taken. Time was of the essence, so the rest of the Division continued its drive to the south against weakening resistance.
General Barton called his commanders together at La Chasse-Doriere and said, "The Division is encountering only scattered resistance, some small arms fire, but no defended positions. They face a defeated enemy, an enemy terribly low in morale, terribly confused. I want you in the next advance to throw caution to the winds—not discretion—but caution. When enemy resistance is encountered, bypass it. If it is too troublesome, leave a force to contain it and move on. Set on." Even as the General spoke, his troops were rushing forward to face a new enemy line. The German High Command attached extreme importance to the holding of Villedieu as an anchor to a new defense line running through Tessy, Percy, and Villedieu, and then southwest. Therefore, it is surprising that Villedieu fell with hardly a shot being fired for the town. Not so for the hills around Tessy, Percy, and south of Villedieu. The battalions fought savagely, and sometimes the battle seesawed back and forth for 24 or 48 hours.
By August 2, the overall picture was as follows: a hole had been torn in the German line; parts of the First Army and the Third Army were rolling through this hole on a dash for Avranches; a corridor had now been formed with the sea on one side and 4th Division on the other. It was of the utmost importance that this corridor through which the Allied armies were pouring be kept open and it was the "Ivy Division" which played a major part in keeping that corridor open.
Obviously the greatest threat to the maintenance of the corridor and to the 4th Division was not pockets of enemy bypassed to the west, but the enemy forces to the east, who were intent not only upon holding on to their positions but upon cutting that corridor as well. Consequently, the entire strength of the Division was now flung into the fight along the enemy's defense line. Still the Germans held on to the commanding terrain, and it was only after the enemy had been bypassed or blasted from a hill that it would fall to the Division. Usually, the Germans fought all day and then attempted to withdraw at night.
When Percy, Tessy, and Villedieu had fallen, the Germans once more pulled back and placed their defenses on a long line of hills running east of, and parallel to, the road from Villedieu to St. Pois. Before they would call "quits" they had to be shoved off these hills. Typical of the battles fought to dislodge the enemy were those over Hill 213 and Hill 211. The latter overlooked the town of St. Pois and the enemy's escape route to the south out of St. Pois. The fall of Hill 211 heralded the end of this phase of operations, for, from its summit the troops had perfect observation upon the retreating enemy columns. Here began the German retreat across Northern France. Many of these fleeing Germans never got any further, however, for artillery, cannon, and mortar fire rained down upon them in a terrible hail which destroyed both men and transport mercilessly.
With this phase of operations practically completed, exhausted infantrymen smiled with joy when told they would soon be pulled back into a rest area. There they would have a chance to recuperate after almost two weeks of continuous fighting which, more often than not, continued through the night. The corridor not only had been maintained but widened: in fact, the enemy's threat from the east was beginning to dissolve; the Third Army was rolling into the Brest Peninsula and parts of the First Army had driven to Mortain, Domfront, and other towns southeast of Avranches. It was on August 6 that the Germans tossed a monkey-wrench into these operations by hurling the first of a series of counterattacks aimed at Avranches. These counterattacks were not well-coordinated because the Germans had become greatly disorganized under hammering blows. In those units where the counter blows fell, however, severe casualties were inflicted and some terrific fighting developed.
Especially was this true at Mortain, where the Germans hit the 30th Infantry Division. During the night of August 6 and the early morning of August 7, the Germans advanced westward on the south bank of the See River with a large force of infantry and tanks. This drive was directed toward Avranches, which the Germans hoped to reach in order to cut the American forces in half. It is impossible to overestimate the significance of such a move had it been successful, for it would have meant that the supply lines would have been cut, and the spearheads of the First and Third Armies would have been compelled to stop.
The 4th Division was ordered into the fight again and, with its artillery firing as it had never fired before, it destroyed the point of the enemy's drive. At this same time, one of the 4th combat teams was attached to the 30th Division to aid in regaining their position at Mortain, and in rescuing its surrounded battalion near there. When this combat team was relieved on August 13th, the German counteroffensive had been defeated and the 4th began a well-deserved rest; its last for a long time.
For its part in the "Hedgerow" and "Breakthrough" campaigns, General Collins again commended the Division—this time after it had been transferred to the V Corps: "With scarcely a pause for rest, the Division was moved directly from Cherbourg into the thick of the fighting southwest of Carentan, where the enemy had had time to organize thoroughly two well-prepared hedgerow positions, the flanks of which rested on difficult swamp land. The Division suffered heavy casualties in the bitter fighting that was required to break through these positions and enlarge the Carentan bridgehead. This swamp and hedgerow fighting was the most difficult that has been encountered anywhere in the campaign thus far."
"Again with only a brief period for reorganization, the 4th Infantry Division was shifted farther to the east in order to participate in the breakthrough between Marigny and St. Gilles. Following the aerial bombardment in which the Division suffered a number of casualties, it jumped off on July 25 and drove ahead to its objective southwest of Marigny, thus preparing the way for the advance of the 3rd Armored Division. During this same period, one of its regiments, the 22nd Infantry, was performing outstanding service while attached to the 2nd Armored Division in checking the enemy drive in the vicinity of Tessy-sur-Vire."
"Following the breakthrough of the VII Corps, the 4th Infantry Division participated in the pursuit that led to the capture of St. Pois and Cherence-le-Roussel. Thereafter, for the next week, it played an important part in preventing a breakthrough by the enemy in his desperate attempt to sever the First and Third American Armies in the Mortain-Cherence-le-Rousselarea. The artillery of the 4th Infantry Division played a major role in annihilating the single enemy column that had succeeded in penetrating to the vicinity of Le Mesnil Adelee." The following week the 4th was moved forward to Carrouges, where it had a good rest. However, it kept one ear open for the expected call to fight further north in the battle of the Falaise Pocket.
Beginning on August 22, the Division drove through Chartres and to the Arpajon-Corbeil area, south of Paris. The situation in and around Paris was confused at this time and the Allied High Command felt that it should strengthen its hand. Finally, on August 25, the Division and the 2nd French Armored Division were ordered to take Paris. Advancing against sporadic small arms fire, the men of the 4th reached the heart of the city at noon. After four years of Nazi tyranny, Paris was free. As wildly applauding French thronged before the Cathedral of Notre Dame and the Hotel de Ville, the wearers of the Ivy Leaf received expressions of appreciation such as only the French can give. Meanwhile, other elements of the Division were fighting their way across the Seine River, meeting serious resistance and receiving the surrender of pockets of bewildered enemy in others.
Leaving the victory parade in honor of the liberation of Paris for outfits following in their wake, the "Ivy Men" pushed on to the north. No one could accuse the World War II Army commanders of committing the same mistake as their World War I counterparts, i.e., not exploiting a breakthrough. Every day their objective was shoved further to the north, and every day great distances were covered. Since the Falaise Gap had failed to catch all of the great German Seventh Army, the Allied plan called for the First Army's sweeping north to Mons, Belgium, in a wide arc so as to gather in the remnants of the fleeing German Seventh. There is no type of operations more exciting than one in which the High Command says, "Well, you've got 'em on the run; go as fast as you can but keep your eyes open."
Anything can happen in an advance as rapid as this, and the fighting troops often find themselves running on reserve rations and reserve gasoline supplies, without maps, and extremely low on ammunition. All of these things happened and yet the 4th continued to roll. By September 3, it had reached St. Quentin, Le Cateau, and Landrecies, fighting its way across many rivers, streams and hills, capturing or killing thousands of Germans headed in the same direction. September 4-6 saw the Division turn eastward in a final sweep across the Meuse River and the Belgian border, heading for the German border and the Siegfried Line. Speculation ran high as to just how tough the Siegfried Line was going to be. Belgian Maquis, the Belgian resistance forces, aided the Division considerably by giving information of enemy activities. Almost every reconnaissance vehicle carried Belgian scouts to act as guides, whose assistance often proved invaluable. The Ivy Division was soon to step foot on German soil.
Originally, this swampy terrain had been of great advantage to them as it had made far easier the task of holding back German troops bent upon cutting through them to Cherbourg. Now, as the direction of their main attack was shifted directly to the south and through this country, they found ourselves attempting to fight their way through a well-positioned enemy. Few types of terrain could lend themselves so well to the requirements of the defender, for here one could dig himself into the hedgerows. To say that the German troops took full advantage of this country's defensive propensities would be understating the truth, for they improved upon them. Against these defenses, the division hurled its might. The first day's gain was 400 yards.
Seven days later, total gains were four miles. This slow, costly and bitter fighting was all to the enemy's advantage—they were forced to fight right down the corridors which the Germans expected them to follow, and the enemy was ready and willing to lay down murderous machine gun fire or artillery barrages upon the 4th. During this period, numerous air bombardments of enemy positions were planned, but each time weather conditions prevented use of air support. Having fought its way to a point near Periers, the Division was pulled out of the line in order to make preparations for the great "breakthrough" to the south.
Up until July 25, the Allied armies had realized what might be called, in a great strategic plan, limited objectives: a beachhead and a port through which to supply future operations. The Allied command realized the armies were advancing but that the gains were bought at such a cost as to make this virtually a war of attrition. Some great blow had to be dealt to the German Army that would send it reeling back, giving the command the opportunity to utilize the tremendous forces at its disposal and which it was amassing behind the lines. This blow, an aerial assault followed by a ground advance, was to be an operation which would punch a hole in the enemy line through which the newly-landed Third U. S. Army, packed behind their front, could pour. The drive was to be made by the VII Corps, with the 4th Division in the center, the 9th on the right, and the 30th on the left.
On July 25, planes flew over, not as on the day before an abortive attack, but in full strength. A combined force, including heavy bombers, making a grand total of three thousand planes, pounded the enemy's front lines. This was not just a great bombardment—it was by all odds the greatest air attack in history. At 0940 the first dive bombers flew over to begin the attack; then followed the heavies. It was a magnificent sight and the Division got a front row view of everything from their positions 1,000 yards back of the target. A huge cloud of dust began to rise over the target and it rolled back toward the waiting infantry.
Unfortunately, the succeeding waves of bombers used this cloud as the target-marker and the bombing dropped back until the infantry was being hit. Men were killed and many others were either wounded or completely stunned. The ferocity of this bombardment left a lasting imprint upon those lucky enough to survive. Lieutenant George Wilson later wrote, “The destructive power of those thousands of five hundred-pound bombs overwhelmed the senses. The dead from both sides lay twisted and torn, some half buried by overturned earth. Bloated cows with stiff legs thrust skyward in death lay everywhere, as did burned-out vehicles and blasted equipment. I've never been able to erase it from my mind.”
Despite this terrifying experience, the four assault companies jumped off at 1100 from their positions 1,000 yards north of the St. Lo-Periers highway. The enemy who had felt the full weight of the mighty blow (that is—what was left of him) fought back with fanaticism and the Division's gains were limited. However, as the drive continued into the night it gathered speed and gained about 2 1/2 kilometers by midnight. It was in the 4th Division zone that real progress was made; it was this Division which pulled the attack forward. The infantry continued to push hard all the next day; and on into the night, in many cases becoming engaged in running fights with columns of fleeing Germans under cover of darkness.
As the giant dagger was being driven into and through the Nazi line, a large pocket of those Germans formed west of the dagger, and as this grew in size its potentiality as a threat to the flank of the Division increased. For this reason, part of the Division was deployed all along the left flank to contain this enemy force centering on Cerisy-la-Salle. Several days later the Germans attacked, but they were stopped and over 2,000 prisoners were taken. Time was of the essence, so the rest of the Division continued its drive to the south against weakening resistance.
General Barton called his commanders together at La Chasse-Doriere and said, "The Division is encountering only scattered resistance, some small arms fire, but no defended positions. They face a defeated enemy, an enemy terribly low in morale, terribly confused. I want you in the next advance to throw caution to the winds—not discretion—but caution. When enemy resistance is encountered, bypass it. If it is too troublesome, leave a force to contain it and move on. Set on." Even as the General spoke, his troops were rushing forward to face a new enemy line. The German High Command attached extreme importance to the holding of Villedieu as an anchor to a new defense line running through Tessy, Percy, and Villedieu, and then southwest. Therefore, it is surprising that Villedieu fell with hardly a shot being fired for the town. Not so for the hills around Tessy, Percy, and south of Villedieu. The battalions fought savagely, and sometimes the battle seesawed back and forth for 24 or 48 hours.
By August 2, the overall picture was as follows: a hole had been torn in the German line; parts of the First Army and the Third Army were rolling through this hole on a dash for Avranches; a corridor had now been formed with the sea on one side and 4th Division on the other. It was of the utmost importance that this corridor through which the Allied armies were pouring be kept open and it was the "Ivy Division" which played a major part in keeping that corridor open.
Obviously the greatest threat to the maintenance of the corridor and to the 4th Division was not pockets of enemy bypassed to the west, but the enemy forces to the east, who were intent not only upon holding on to their positions but upon cutting that corridor as well. Consequently, the entire strength of the Division was now flung into the fight along the enemy's defense line. Still the Germans held on to the commanding terrain, and it was only after the enemy had been bypassed or blasted from a hill that it would fall to the Division. Usually, the Germans fought all day and then attempted to withdraw at night.
When Percy, Tessy, and Villedieu had fallen, the Germans once more pulled back and placed their defenses on a long line of hills running east of, and parallel to, the road from Villedieu to St. Pois. Before they would call "quits" they had to be shoved off these hills. Typical of the battles fought to dislodge the enemy were those over Hill 213 and Hill 211. The latter overlooked the town of St. Pois and the enemy's escape route to the south out of St. Pois. The fall of Hill 211 heralded the end of this phase of operations, for, from its summit the troops had perfect observation upon the retreating enemy columns. Here began the German retreat across Northern France. Many of these fleeing Germans never got any further, however, for artillery, cannon, and mortar fire rained down upon them in a terrible hail which destroyed both men and transport mercilessly.
With this phase of operations practically completed, exhausted infantrymen smiled with joy when told they would soon be pulled back into a rest area. There they would have a chance to recuperate after almost two weeks of continuous fighting which, more often than not, continued through the night. The corridor not only had been maintained but widened: in fact, the enemy's threat from the east was beginning to dissolve; the Third Army was rolling into the Brest Peninsula and parts of the First Army had driven to Mortain, Domfront, and other towns southeast of Avranches. It was on August 6 that the Germans tossed a monkey-wrench into these operations by hurling the first of a series of counterattacks aimed at Avranches. These counterattacks were not well-coordinated because the Germans had become greatly disorganized under hammering blows. In those units where the counter blows fell, however, severe casualties were inflicted and some terrific fighting developed.
Especially was this true at Mortain, where the Germans hit the 30th Infantry Division. During the night of August 6 and the early morning of August 7, the Germans advanced westward on the south bank of the See River with a large force of infantry and tanks. This drive was directed toward Avranches, which the Germans hoped to reach in order to cut the American forces in half. It is impossible to overestimate the significance of such a move had it been successful, for it would have meant that the supply lines would have been cut, and the spearheads of the First and Third Armies would have been compelled to stop.
The 4th Division was ordered into the fight again and, with its artillery firing as it had never fired before, it destroyed the point of the enemy's drive. At this same time, one of the 4th combat teams was attached to the 30th Division to aid in regaining their position at Mortain, and in rescuing its surrounded battalion near there. When this combat team was relieved on August 13th, the German counteroffensive had been defeated and the 4th began a well-deserved rest; its last for a long time.
For its part in the "Hedgerow" and "Breakthrough" campaigns, General Collins again commended the Division—this time after it had been transferred to the V Corps: "With scarcely a pause for rest, the Division was moved directly from Cherbourg into the thick of the fighting southwest of Carentan, where the enemy had had time to organize thoroughly two well-prepared hedgerow positions, the flanks of which rested on difficult swamp land. The Division suffered heavy casualties in the bitter fighting that was required to break through these positions and enlarge the Carentan bridgehead. This swamp and hedgerow fighting was the most difficult that has been encountered anywhere in the campaign thus far."
"Again with only a brief period for reorganization, the 4th Infantry Division was shifted farther to the east in order to participate in the breakthrough between Marigny and St. Gilles. Following the aerial bombardment in which the Division suffered a number of casualties, it jumped off on July 25 and drove ahead to its objective southwest of Marigny, thus preparing the way for the advance of the 3rd Armored Division. During this same period, one of its regiments, the 22nd Infantry, was performing outstanding service while attached to the 2nd Armored Division in checking the enemy drive in the vicinity of Tessy-sur-Vire."
"Following the breakthrough of the VII Corps, the 4th Infantry Division participated in the pursuit that led to the capture of St. Pois and Cherence-le-Roussel. Thereafter, for the next week, it played an important part in preventing a breakthrough by the enemy in his desperate attempt to sever the First and Third American Armies in the Mortain-Cherence-le-Rousselarea. The artillery of the 4th Infantry Division played a major role in annihilating the single enemy column that had succeeded in penetrating to the vicinity of Le Mesnil Adelee." The following week the 4th was moved forward to Carrouges, where it had a good rest. However, it kept one ear open for the expected call to fight further north in the battle of the Falaise Pocket.
Beginning on August 22, the Division drove through Chartres and to the Arpajon-Corbeil area, south of Paris. The situation in and around Paris was confused at this time and the Allied High Command felt that it should strengthen its hand. Finally, on August 25, the Division and the 2nd French Armored Division were ordered to take Paris. Advancing against sporadic small arms fire, the men of the 4th reached the heart of the city at noon. After four years of Nazi tyranny, Paris was free. As wildly applauding French thronged before the Cathedral of Notre Dame and the Hotel de Ville, the wearers of the Ivy Leaf received expressions of appreciation such as only the French can give. Meanwhile, other elements of the Division were fighting their way across the Seine River, meeting serious resistance and receiving the surrender of pockets of bewildered enemy in others.
Leaving the victory parade in honor of the liberation of Paris for outfits following in their wake, the "Ivy Men" pushed on to the north. No one could accuse the World War II Army commanders of committing the same mistake as their World War I counterparts, i.e., not exploiting a breakthrough. Every day their objective was shoved further to the north, and every day great distances were covered. Since the Falaise Gap had failed to catch all of the great German Seventh Army, the Allied plan called for the First Army's sweeping north to Mons, Belgium, in a wide arc so as to gather in the remnants of the fleeing German Seventh. There is no type of operations more exciting than one in which the High Command says, "Well, you've got 'em on the run; go as fast as you can but keep your eyes open."
Anything can happen in an advance as rapid as this, and the fighting troops often find themselves running on reserve rations and reserve gasoline supplies, without maps, and extremely low on ammunition. All of these things happened and yet the 4th continued to roll. By September 3, it had reached St. Quentin, Le Cateau, and Landrecies, fighting its way across many rivers, streams and hills, capturing or killing thousands of Germans headed in the same direction. September 4-6 saw the Division turn eastward in a final sweep across the Meuse River and the Belgian border, heading for the German border and the Siegfried Line. Speculation ran high as to just how tough the Siegfried Line was going to be. Belgian Maquis, the Belgian resistance forces, aided the Division considerably by giving information of enemy activities. Almost every reconnaissance vehicle carried Belgian scouts to act as guides, whose assistance often proved invaluable. The Ivy Division was soon to step foot on German soil.